Across whistleblowing remedies, discrimination timing, COT3 settlement effect, costs and redundancy consultation, the EAT reinforces a consistent theme: technical framing, evidence and statutory gateways frequently drive the final result.
When compensation gets re-examined after a whistleblowing win
This appeal goes to the remedy rather than the liability stage in whistleblowing dismissal claims. You can read the appeal judgment here: Dr J Mullen v Melian Dialogue Research Ltd [2025] EAT 179.
Dr Mullen had succeeded in the Employment Tribunal in claims of protected disclosure (whistleblowing) unfair dismissal and detriment. The focus in the original tribunal hearing was not just on whether dismissal and detriments were unlawful, but also on what compensation should be awarded once liability had been established.
What ended up in the EAT?
On appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Judge Tayler) took a fresh look at several aspects of the remedy determination rather than revisiting the core finding that Dr Mullen’s dismissal was automatically unfair because of protected disclosures. The EAT concluded that the Employment Tribunal had erred in the way it assessed compensation and sent the remedy issues back to a differently constituted tribunal to be re-decided.
The key remedy issues included:
Polkey deduction: The Employment Tribunal reduced the compensatory award under the Polkey principle (i.e., accounting for the chance the claimant would have been fairly dismissed anyway). The EAT held there was no proper evidential basis for the percentage reduction the tribunal applied.
Mitigation of loss: The tribunal had also reduced the award on the basis that Dr Mullen had not mitigated his loss (for example, by earning or seeking work). The EAT found that the tribunal’s approach to this was legally wrong: it effectively required the claimant to prove he acted reasonably, when it was for the respondent to show unreasonable conduct in mitigation.
New business expenses: The Employment Tribunal had failed to decide whether Dr Mullen should be compensated for actual expenses he incurred in setting up a new business after dismissal. The EAT said this must now be properly addressed on remittal.
Injury to feelings/aggravated damages: The original award included an injury to feelings sum that was the subject of a cross-appeal. The claimant conceded there was no jurisdiction for an injury to feelings award in this context. The EAT agreed, and that issue will also be dealt with on remittal.
HR takeaways from Mullen
Compensation is a technical exercise: Even when liability is clear, getting compensation right requires careful application of Polkey, mitigation and jurisdictional rules – and tribunals must explain why they have reached the figures they do.
Mitigation needs evidence and correct framing: Employers who seek to reduce awards for mitigation must actually prove unreasonable failure to mitigate; it’s not enough to point to a lack of evidence from the claimant alone.
Don’t skip issues just because liability was agreed: Expenses a claimant actually incurred (e.g., setting up a new business) can legitimately form part of a remedy, and tribunals should not ignore them.
For HR and legal teams, Mullen is a timely reminder that remedy litigation can turn on its own legal complexities, separate from the facts that secured liability in the first place — so careful preparation and clear evidence on compensation issues is essential once an unfair dismissal or protected disclosure claim succeeds.
Brexit letters, discipline and a time‑barred race claim
This case is about how time limits and the correct legal basis for discrimination claims can make or break a case, particularly when the alleged discrimination relates to race and post‑Brexit changes. You can read the appeal judgment here: Mr T Tamponi v Medequip Assistive Technology Ltd [2025] EAT 180.
Mr Tamponi, an Italian national (and therefore an EU/EEA citizen), worked for Medequip Assistive Technology Ltd. He brought direct race discrimination complaints linked to two broad sets of events:
letters Medequip sent in late 2020 and early 2021 about the need for EU staff to apply for settled status after Brexit; and
disciplinary treatment he faced following a dispute over work processes that led to a disciplinary investigation and his eventual dismissal for refusing to renew a DBS check.
What ended up in the EAT?
The original Employment Tribunal dismissed Mr Tamponi’s direct race discrimination claims. On appeal to the EAT (Judge Auerbach), the tribunal’s decision was upheld — and the appeal was dismissed. Here’s why:
Time limits were fatal
The EAT agreed the discrimination complaints were out of time under the Equality Act 2010 and that it was not just and equitable to extend the time limit. Mr Tamponi’s ACAS Early Conciliation did not start soon enough to bring his complaints within the statutory three‑month period.
’Detriment’ and the merits
Even putting time aside, the tribunal had also found that the settled‑status letters were not a detriment within the meaning of discrimination law — they were seen as information about regulatory changes, not discriminatory treatment “because of race”. There was no appeal against that point.
Race vs immigration status
The EAT confirmed that, under leading Supreme Court authority, immigration status is distinct from race under the Equality Act. That meant that any adverse conduct linked to post‑Brexit right‑to‑work requirements could not automatically be treated as direct race discrimination unless it was shown to be because of nationality itself — not just status.
Relatedly, the tribunal’s analysis that the conduct was driven by the respondent’s understanding of changing immigration rules — and not by Mr Tamponi’s nationality per se — stood unchallenged.
HR takeaways from Tamponi
Time limits matter hugely: Even strong‑feeling discrimination complaints can be dismissed before reaching the substantive merits if not lodged in time and properly linked to ACAS Early Conciliation deadlines. HR teams should ensure any internal grievance or external claim is progressed swiftly and with legal advice on timing.
Know the legal basis for claims: Race discrimination claims require detriment “because of” a protected characteristic. Conduct linked to regulatory or administrative changes (e.g., post‑Brexit status updates) may not automatically qualify, even when it feels unfair to the individual.
Documentation and explanation count: Clear documentation about why communications are being sent, and evidence that they’re driven by compliance (not bias), can help fortify the employer’s position if a tribunal ends up reviewing discrimination arguments.
For HR teams, Tamponi underscores how procedural issues (like time limits) and correct framing of claims are just as critical as the underlying facts — and how easily a discrimination complaint can be lost on those grounds alone, even before the substantive merits are fully explored.
When a settlement deal and costs are reviewed by the EAT
This appeal isn’t about unfair dismissal or discrimination, but about whether an agreement to end employment became a binding contract, and whether a tribunal costs order was set at the right level. You can read the judgment here: QR v The G.I. Group Ltd [2025] EAT 178.
The facts in brief
QR (the claimant) had worked for The G.I. Group Ltd for many years. In December 2022 she and the employer discussed ending her employment by mutual agreement, with a proposed payment of £40,000 in return for her leaving. There were negotiations at a meeting about flexible working and grievance issues, and heads of terms were discussed. However, no formal written agreement was signed, and the claimant did not obtain independent legal advice on the deal before her employment ended.
She later brought claims in the employment tribunal, including that the parties had reached an enforceable agreement under which the employer was contractually obliged to pay her £40,000 when her employment ended. The tribunal treated this as a preliminary issue and held that no binding contract had been made. The tribunal also ordered the claimant to pay £10,100 of the respondent’s costs, saying some of her procedural applications had no reasonable prospects of success.
What the EAT decided
On appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Deputy Judge Michael Ford KC), the EAT considered two separate issues: whether there was a binding contract, and whether the costs order was correct.
No binding contract (appeal dismissed)
The EAT upheld the tribunal’s decision that there was no concluded agreement that could be enforced as a contract. Although key terms had been discussed, both sides understood that any final settlement would need to be reduced to writing and signed, and the claimant would need independent legal advice under section 203 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 before it became binding. Because these formal steps did not happen, there was no complete contract.Costs order (appeal allowed in part)
The tribunal was entitled to make a costs order because some of the claimant’s procedural applications had no reasonable prospects of success. However, the EAT held that the tribunal had erred in how it calculated the amount. In particular:The tribunal shouldn’t have focused on the joint income of the claimant and her husband when considering her ability to pay; and
It should have given clearer reasons for the level of costs awarded.
So, while the substance of the costs order (that some costs could be paid by the claimant) was upheld, the EAT remitted the case on costs for reconsideration of the amount in light of the correct approach.
HR takeaways from QR v The G.I. Group Ltd
Heads of terms are not enough: For settlement deals that affect statutory rights, both a signed written agreement and independent legal advice are essential if the parties want an enforceable contract rather than just an agreement in principle.
Costs orders require careful reasoning: Tribunals can make costs orders where applications lack reasonable prospects of success, but they must also take a claimant’s actual ability to pay into account and explain both why costs are justified and how much is appropriate.
Procedural applications can backfire: Procedural challenges (e.g., strike‑out requests, disclosure applications) that are seen as unarguable or unreasonable can lead to adverse costs consequences.
For HR, the case underlines that formal process and documentation matter at settlement stages just as much as they do at dispute or dismissal stages — and that tribunal costs orders are not just theoretical: they can bite where litigation conduct falls short of standards.
No basic award from the Secretary of State without a tribunal decision
This case looks at whether an employee can recover a basic award for unfair dismissal from the state (via the National Insurance Fund) when their employer went insolvent before a tribunal had decided the unfair dismissal claim. You can read the appeal judgment here: Mr M Chaudhry v 1) Paperchase Products Ltd (in administration) 2) Secretary of State for Business and Trade [2025] EAT 181.
Background
Mr Chaudhry was a long‑serving site manager for Paperchase who was dismissed in October 2018 and brought an unfair dismissal claim in a timely fashion. Paperchase defended that claim. Before it could be fully heard or decided, Paperchase entered administration and the tribunal proceedings were stayed (put on hold). Mr Chaudhry pursued part of his remedy by seeking payment of a basic award from the Secretary of State under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the ERA”) once the employer became insolvent.
What the EAT had to decide
The key legal point was straightforward in wording but significant in consequence: can an employee recover a basic award for unfair dismissal from the National Insurance Fund (through the Secretary of State) without first having a tribunal decide that the dismissal was unfair and actually make the award?
The EAT’s decision — appeal dismissed
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (Mr Justice Kerr) upheld the tribunal’s decision and dismissed Mr Chaudhry’s appeal. The EAT agreed that:
Under the current statute (Part XII of the ERA), there must first be a tribunal decision awarding a basic award for unfair dismissal before the Secretary of State can be liable to pay that basic award out of the National Insurance Fund.
Mr Chaudhry’s original unfair dismissal claim against Paperchase remains stayed and no tribunal has yet made such a finding or award. Therefore, there was no award for the Secretary of State to pay, even though Paperchase became insolvent and the claim was otherwise timely.
Arguments that EU‑derived principles (such as the Insolvency Directive or EU law concepts of effectiveness/non‑discrimination) should alter this interpretation could not be sustained, because the domestic statute’s wording is clear: a tribunal must first decide entitlement to a basic award.
HR and insolvency practitioner takeaways
Timing and tribunal decisions matter: In insolvency scenarios, employees seeking state‑backed basic award payments must first secure an actual tribunal award of a basic award — not just lodge a claim or have it stayed because of insolvency.
Statutory wording governs: Even if an employer’s insolvency makes it practically very difficult to get a tribunal hearing, the statutory scheme under the ERA still requires a tribunal to decide the claim before any state payment can follow.
Strategic litigation planning: Where insolvency risks are foreseeable, it may be sensible (when possible) to pursue tribunal hearings earlier or seek administrator consent/ court permission to lift stays so a decision can be obtained and state recovery triggered.
For HR, legal teams and insolvency practitioners, Chaudhry is a timely reminder that statutory preconditions for state‑backed compensation are strict — and even well‑intended policy goals (like protecting employees on insolvency) don’t override clear legislative language that requires a tribunal award first.
Grossing‑up, multi‑million awards and when new points can’t be raised
This appeal isn’t about whether the claimant won — he did — but about whether the employer could challenge a specific part of the remedy the Employment Tribunal awarded after finding age discrimination and unfair dismissal. You can read the appeal judgment here: Vesuvius Plc and Others v Mr Glenn Cowie [2025] EAT 183.
The backdrop
Mr Glenn Cowie brought a long running claim against his former employer, Vesuvius Plc, for age discrimination and unfair dismissal. After a multi‑day liability hearing, the Employment Tribunal found in Mr Cowie’s favour and then went on to decide remedy. His schedule of loss included a figure to “gross up” part of the award for national insurance contributions (NIC) he said he would have to pay. The tribunal accepted that and eventually awarded over £3 million — including about £95,000 for grossing up in respect of NIC. That amount was paid, and the employer complied with tax obligations on the payment.
What the appeal was about
Vesuvius appealed, arguing that it was an error of law to include the gross‑up for national insurance in the remedy. The claimant later accepted that grossing up for NIC was legally incorrect — NIC is not payable on such awards — but maintained that the employer could not rely on this “new point” on appeal because it was not put before the Employment Tribunal during remedy hearings.
EAT’s analysis and decision
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (Judge Shanks) accepted that the point was a “new point” (i.e. not previously articulated in writing or at hearing below). However, raising a new point on appeal is not automatically barred — the EAT has discretion to decide whether to allow it.
The EAT considered several factors in exercising that discretion:
Prejudice to the claimant: Mr Cowie had already paid tax (in the UK and abroad) based on the award that included the gross‑up, and it would be difficult to “unscramble” the financial consequences.
Responsibility for the error: Although both parties and the tribunal arguably shared some responsibility for how the issue arose, the employer bore the primary responsibility for not raising the point earlier.
Conduct of the litigation and time elapsed: The litigation had been long and hard‑fought, and for a period the claimant would have reasonably believed matters were concluded.
Taking all relevant factors into account, the EAT exercised its discretion not to allow the new point to be taken on appeal — and therefore dismissed the appeal, leaving the original tribunal judgment (including the gross‑up figure) intact.
HR takeaways from Vesuvius v Cowie
Be proactive on remedy points: Points about how compensation should be calculated (e.g., what should or should not be included) should ideally be raised during remedy hearings, not saved for appeal — otherwise there’s a real risk they won’t be entertainable later.
“New points” on appeal are risky: Even if an appeal point is genuinely new, an appellate tribunal will consider the practical consequences and whether it’s fair to allow it — especially where significant sums are involved and the respondent may have reasonably believed matters were closed.
Planning for tax consequences is important: When negotiating settlements or drafting schedules of loss, both sides should be clear about tax treatment and avoid assumptions (e.g., about NIC) that could complicate or extend litigation unnecessarily.
For HR teams, Vesuvius v Cowie is a reminder that remedy and compensation issues are not just a numbers game — they are technical, can be appeal points in their own right, and can become entrenched if not addressed promptly and clearly in tribunal proceedings.
When “Banter” isn’t harassment – and why context matters
This appeal looked at whether a series of workplace interactions and messages amounted to sexual harassment in law. You can read the appeal judgment here: Miss Emma Nunn v G. and M.J. Crouch and Son Ltd t/a Crouch Recovery [2025] EAT 187.
What the case was about
Ms Nunn, who had worked for Crouch Recovery for several years as accounts manager, brought multiple complaints in the employment tribunal after she resigned, including claims of sexual harassment based on text/WhatsApp messages and comments by male colleagues that she said were lewd or offensive.
At first instance the Employment Tribunal rejected the harassment claims on the basis that the conduct relied on was not “unwanted” by Ms Nunn and did not have the legally required effect on her — in reaching that view, the tribunal noted she had not complained at the time and, in many instances, appeared to go along with the banter.
Ms Nunn appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Judge Shanks), arguing that the tribunal had erred in law in its assessment of whether the conduct was unwanted and in how it treated evidence about her reactions and the workplace context.
What the EAT decided
The EAT dismissed the appeal, upholding the tribunal’s conclusions on sexual harassment. Key aspects of the EAT’s reasoning included:
The Employment Tribunal had carefully considered the context and all the evidence, including the close personal/professional relationship between Ms Nunn and her colleagues, and how she had responded in real time (e.g., laughing or engaging in the banter).
Although some comments and messages were objectively vulgar or offensive, the tribunal’s finding that Ms Nunn did not perceive them as unwanted at the time was a factual conclusion open to it on the evidence.
The absence of contemporaneous complaints and the fact she occasionally reacted in a seemingly relaxed or even convivial way with the conduct meant the tribunal could properly say the focus conduct did not, in context, meet the statutory harassment test.
On that basis, the EAT concluded there was no legal error in how the tribunal approached the harassment claims and dismissed the appeal.
HR takeaways from Nunn v Crouch Recovery
Harassment is about unwanted impact: Even objectively offensive conduct may not amount to harassment in law if the claimant’s own response and the context suggest they did not genuinely see it as unwelcome at the time.
Context and relationships matter: Tribunals will look closely at the workplace environment, relationships between parties, and how employees responded in real life — not just the content of individual comments.
Contemporaneous complaints are strong evidence: A failure to make immediate or near‑immediate complaints about offensive conduct can significantly weaken a harassment claim, although it’s not decisive in every case.
This decision underscores that not all crude or lewd comments lead to a finding of harassment — tribunals have to assess whether the conduct was genuinely unwanted and had the prohibited effect on the individual in context. For HR teams, Nunn is a reminder to take allegations seriously, document responses, and address inappropriate conduct promptly to avoid ambiguity about whether behaviour was genuinely unwelcome.
When constructive dismissal turns on employer conduct, not procedure
This case is about whether a schoolteacher’s resignation amounted to constructive unfair dismissal because of how her grievance was handled — and what actually matters legally in that assessment. You can read the judgment here: Ms Jen Nelson v Renfrewshire Council [2025] EAT 189.
What happened in the case
Ms Jen Nelson worked for Renfrewshire Council as a support for learning teacher. After an interaction with her head teacher that she felt was aggressive and intimidating, she raised a formal grievance. The council had a multi‑stage grievance process, and Ms Nelson pursued the first two stages but did not complete the final stage of the process.
She resigned in frustration, believing the grievance had been mishandled and that the relationship of mutual trust and confidence had broken down. She then brought a claim for constructive unfair dismissal in the Employment Tribunal.
At first instance, the tribunal found that although the grievance handling had some shortcomings, the conduct did not reach the threshold of a repudiatory breach of contract, partly because internal procedures had not been exhausted. The tribunal therefore held she was not constructively dismissed.
What ended up in the EAT?
On appeal, Ms Nelson argued that the tribunal had erred in law by placing weight on her failure to complete the grievance process and by considering hypothetical future outcomes when assessing whether the implied term of trust and confidence had been breached.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (Lady Poole) dismissed the appeal and upheld the tribunal’s decision. Key points from the EAT included:
The tribunal applied the correct legal test — an objective assessment of whether the employer’s conduct amounted to a fundamental breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.
References by the tribunal to things like “bad faith,” “deliberate manipulation” or “overt hostility” did not show a misdirection of law when its reasons were read as a whole. Tribunals are allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the facts before them.
An Employment Tribunal decision on constructive dismissal is primarily a question of fact, because it benefits from assessing witness credibility and the detailed circumstances at first instance. There was no clear legal error in how the tribunal reached its conclusions.
Importantly, the EAT confirmed that whether an employee’s contract has been repudiated is not judged by what might have happened in a later stage of internal processes, but by whether, objectively, the employer’s conduct had already damaged mutual trust and confidence enough to justify the employee’s resignation at the time.
HR takeaways from Nelson v Renfrewshire Council
• Focus on employer conduct, not procedure per se: When assessing constructive dismissal, tribunals look at whether the employer’s conduct objectively amounted to a fundamental breach — not whether the employee exhausted all procedural steps first.
• Handle grievances transparently and thoroughly: Even where internal procedures aren’t fully exhausted, how seriously and fairly grievances are dealt with can be crucial evidence in any subsequent tribunal claim. Missed or flawed steps can still be counted against the employer if they show trust and confidence were damaged.
• Tribunals evaluate evidence as a whole: Tribunal findings about employer conduct and the resulting impact on the employment relationship will rarely be lightly overturned on appeal unless there is a clear legal error — because tribunals can assess witness evidence firsthand.
For HR teams, Nelson underscores that procedural technicalities (like exhausting grievance steps) are secondary to the actual conduct and impact when it comes to constructive dismissal claims — and that complaints of ill‑treatment must be addressed promptly, fairly and with an eye on how they affect trust and confidence.
Withdrawal, ignorance and the finality of tribunal claims
This appeal isn’t about discrimination merits — it’s about what happens when a claimant withdraws their claim and then later tries to revisit that decision. You can read the appeal judgment here: Ms Dalvinder Kaur v Birmingham City Council [2025] EAT 190.
Background
Ms Kaur was a long‑serving employee of Birmingham City Council who, while off sick, started an employment tribunal claim in 2022 bringing complaints including disability and sex discrimination. However, in June 2022 she wrote to the tribunal asking to withdraw her claim, saying she couldn’t proceed alone due to mental health struggles. The tribunal (via a Legal Officer) dismissed the claim upon withdrawal under the tribunal rules.
Ms Kaur later instructed solicitors for a potential civil personal injury claim, and around seven months after the withdrawal she asked the tribunal to revisit its dismissal decision, explaining she had been unaware of the implications of her withdrawal at the time. The tribunal refused that request, and Ms Kaur appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
What the EAT Decided
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (Judge Auerbach) dismissed Ms Kaur’s appeal, agreeing that the tribunal did not err in upholding the dismissal upon withdrawal or in refusing to reconsider it. Key points were:
Withdrawal generally ends the claim: Under Rule 52 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure, when a claimant informs the tribunal in writing that they wish to withdraw their claim, the tribunal is usually required to dismiss it unless the claimant has expressed a clear desire to reserve the right to bring the same complaint again or the tribunal believes dismissal would not be in the interests of justice.
No clear reservation of rights: At the time she withdrew, Ms Kaur did not indicate that she wanted to reserve the right to pursue her claim later — she simply asked to withdraw due to illness. The tribunal also did not have good reason to treat it as in the interests of justice to not dismiss the claim permanently.
Ignorance is not enough: The EAT confirmed the tribunal was not required to give special weight to the claimant’s lack of understanding about the finality of withdrawal, even though she genuinely didn’t appreciate what it meant for bringing future claims. The tribunal correctly concluded she should have informed her solicitors of the prior claim earlier and could have preserved her rights then — so her later explanation did not make it unjust to dismiss her application.
As a result, the EAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the tribunal’s refusal to revisit the dismissal upon withdrawal.
HR takeaways From Kaur v Birmingham City Council
Withdrawal is serious: When a claimant withdraws their ET claim in writing, that usually ends their ability to pursue the same or substantially the same complaints later — unless they expressly reserve the right to come back or the tribunal decides dismissal wouldn’t be in the interests of justice.
Be clear on intentions: If an employee wants to pause proceedings while preserving future rights (e.g., when they are poorly or seeking legal advice), they should explicitly tell the tribunal that they wish to reserve their right to bring the complaint later. Simply asking to withdraw due to difficulty is not enough.
Documentation and legal advice matter: Claimants who are unrepresented should be advised (or encouraged) to seek legal advice before withdrawing claims, as ignorance of the finality of tribunal withdrawal has no special legal protection if it leads to dismissal of the claim.
For HR teams, Kaur is a reminder that procedural decisions have real consequences — and that employers (and advisers) should understand how withdrawals, reservations of rights and “interests of justice” assessments work, because a claimant may inadvertently extinguish their own rights without intending to do so.
Redundancy consultation: who counts and when the duty arises
This appeal looked at whether a redundancy dismissal was unfair because collective consultation should have happened first — and, if so, whether the tribunal erred in how it applied the law. You can read the appeal judgment here: Micro Focus Ltd v Mr James Mildenhall [2025] EAT 188.
Background
Mr Mildenhall worked for Micro Focus Ltd and was selected for redundancy. At first instance, the Employment Tribunal found both that his dismissal was unfair and that the employer had breached its collective consultation duty under section 188 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) by failing to consult when a proposal was made to dismiss 20 or more employees within a 90‑day period. On that basis, the tribunal awarded compensation for unfair dismissal and a 90‑day protective award.
Micro Focus appealed, arguing that the tribunal had misapplied the law on when the duty to consult arises and on how to count employees for that purpose.
What ended up in the EAT?
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (Deputy Judge Michael Ford KC) allowed the appeal in part and clarified several key legal points.
Duty to consult depends on proposals within one entity
The tribunal had concluded that Micro Focus owed a duty to consult because it was acting as the “de facto employer” for many staff across the corporate group. The EAT held that was wrong in law: for the purposes of s.188 TULRCA, the duty to consult arises when an employer — meaning the specific legal employing entity — is proposing to dismiss 20 or more employees over 90 days. It is not enough that a group company has influence or operational control if the contracts of employment are with different legal entities.Misinterpretation of EU Case Law (Marclean)
The tribunal had also relied on a particular EU judgment (Marclean) to interpret the duty to consult. The EAT found the tribunal had misread the relevance of Marclean: the case was about the definition of collective redundancies at the Directive level, not about the meaning of “proposing” in s.188 TULRCA. Thus the tribunal’s approach was legally incorrect.Other Findings Upheld
The EAT did not find error in other aspects of the tribunal’s reasoning, including points about how the redundancy pool was constructed or other fairness issues unrelated to the consultation duty.
As a result, the tribunal’s finding that Micro Focus had failed to consult because it was a “de facto employer” for multiple legally distinct entities was set aside, and the protective award liability (which stems from that failure) also falls away on that basis.
HR takeaways from Micro Focus v Mildenhall
Know when collective consultation duty kicks in: Employers should identify which legal employing entity is proposing redundancies — only that entity’s workforce counts towards the 20+ threshold under s.188 TULRCA for collective consultation duties.
Don’t assume group‑wide counting: Large multinational or multi-entity groups should not assume they must consult just because many colleagues are affected across the group; legal contracts and payroll records matter.
Check how external case law applies: EU and Directive cases can be relevant, but they often deal with concepts at a different level than the domestic statutory language — tribunals and advisers need to apply them carefully.
For HR and legal teams involved in redundancy planning, Micro Focus v Mildenhall is a useful reminder that the duty to consult is fact‑specific and tied to the legal employing entity rather than broader operational or group relationships — and getting this right can avoid protective award liabilities.
When a settlement deal ends more than you think
This appeal was really about the effect of a COT3 settlement agreement on a live Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) appeal — not the original merits of the underlying complaints themselves. You can read the judgment here: Mr T Turner v Western Mortgage Services Ltd [2025] EAT 191.
What happened in the case
Mr Turner had brought an employment tribunal claim against Western Mortgage Services Ltd relating to non‑payment of Permanent Health Insurance (PHI) payments and employer pension contributions after he resigned because of ill health. His first claim was withdrawn and dismissed. He then brought a second tribunal claim covering similar PHI, pension and disability discrimination issues. In that second claim, the tribunal struck out the PHI part but allowed the pension and some related claims to proceed. The claimant appealed the strike‑out of the PHI complaints to the EAT.
While that appeal was pending, the parties reached a COT3 settlement agreement through ACAS in July 2023 on the basis of the second claim’s case number. The agreement stated that the claimant would withdraw his tribunal claim in return for a settlement sum and that it would be a full and final settlement of any and all claims he had or might have against the respondent, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions. Neither party informed the EAT about this COT3 at the time.
After the COT3 was signed, the EAT — unaware of it — granted permission for Mr Turner’s appeal to go forward. Western Mortgage Services then told the EAT that the claim had been settled and the appeal should not proceed. Mr Turner said he intended to continue the appeal in any event.
What the EAT decided
Judge Auerbach held that the COT3 was a binding settlement contract and that, on an objective interpretation of its wording and context, it had the effect of compromising all the complaints that had been pursued under that second claim number — including the issue that was subject to the pending EAT appeal. Because:
The claimant agreed to withdraw the whole tribunal claim under that case number;
The settlement promised “full and final settlement of any and all claims which the claimant has or may have against the respondent” (excluding narrow categories); and
The tribunal appeal was a by‑product of those tribunal complaints;
the COT3 covered and therefore settled the subject matter of the appeal too.
As a result, the EAT concluded that the appeal was barred by the COT3 settlement and dismissed it. Judge Auerbach also noted that the claimant did not argue the agreement was not binding (for example, due to duress or incapacity), so the EAT did not need to consider those lines of argument.
HR takeaways from Turner v Western Mortgage Services
COT3 settlements can have broad effect: A COT3 that uses language like “all claims which the claimant has or may have” and is connected to a specific tribunal case number can, when objectively interpreted, cover related appeals on the issues it settles.
Tell the tribunal about settlements: If a claim has been fully settled by a COT3 while an appeal is pending, it’s essential to notify the EAT immediately — otherwise the EAT may proceed without that knowledge only to have to sort things out later.
Be clear about scope when drafting: Employers and advisers should draft settlement terms carefully and explicitly if they intend a COT3 to cover — or not to cover — specific appeals or aspects of claims. Wording about which claims are compromised and which are excluded really matters.
For HR teams and advisers, Turner shows that the words used in settlement agreements are not just semantics: they can quietly extinguish ongoing litigation and bar future rights unless both sides clearly understand and record what is being settled — including whether appeals are captured.
When agreeing a settlement ends more than you think
This appeal wasn’t about the underlying merits of Mr Turner’s claims — it was about whether his COT3 settlement agreement also extinguished a pending Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) appeal. You can read the judgment here: Mr T Turner v Western Mortgage Services Ltd [2025] EAT 191.
Quick Background
Mr Turner brought a second ET claim against Western Mortgage Services Ltd after an earlier dismissal. The tribunal struck out part of his claim (PHI payments) but allowed other parts to proceed — and Mr Turner appealed the strike‑out to the EAT.
While that appeal was pending, the parties reached a COT3 settlement in the Employment Tribunal, resolving “any and all claims which the claimant has or may have” with Western Mortgage Services in return for a payment. Neither party told the EAT about the settlement initially.
When Western later informed the EAT that the tribunal claim was settled by COT3, the employer argued the subsequent appeal should not continue. The claimant wanted to pursue it anyway.
EAT’s decision — appeal dismissed
Judge Auerbach held that the COT3 was a binding settlement contract. Reading the wording and context objectively showed that:
The claimant had agreed to withdraw the entire tribunal complaint under that case number;
The settlement was drafted as a full and final resolution of all claims “he has or may have”; and
The EAT appeal stemmed from those same claims.
On that basis, the appeal was barred by the settlement and was dismissed. There was no dispute that the COT3 was binding, and no successful argument that it was entered into under duress or incapacity.
HR takeaways from Turner v Western Mortgage Services
COT3s can quietly extinguish appeals: If a settlement says it resolves “any and all claims … he may have,” that wording can quite legitimately cover related appeals arising from the settled claim — even if the appeal hasn’t yet been heard.
Tell the tribunal about settlements promptly: If a claim or appeal is settled while proceedings are live, both sides should inform the tribunal right away. Failing to do so means the tribunal may proceed without knowing the case has effectively ended.
Draft settlement terms carefully: If you intend a COT3/compromise agreement to either include or exclude specific appeals or aspects of claims, use clear, precise wording. Ambiguous language that looks like a “global release” will typically be interpreted objectively — and may cover more than you expect.
For HR and legal teams, Turner reinforces that words in settlement agreements have real legal force — they don’t just end tribunal claims, they can also wipe out appeals tied to those claims unless it’s very clear that was not the intention.
No consultation? No fair redundancy — and it matters more than you think
This appeal concerned whether an Employment Tribunal was right to dismiss an employee’s unfair dismissal claim, even though it had found there was no consultation before a redundancy dismissal. You can read the full appeal judgment here: Gormley v Phoenix Business Solutions (UK) Ltd [2025] EAT 198.
The facts in brief
Mr Gormley was dismissed on grounds of redundancy. At the original Employment Tribunal hearing, it was common ground that:
there was a genuine redundancy situation and redundancy was the reason for dismissal;
but Phoenix Business Solutions Ltd did not undertake formal consultation with Mr Gormley before dismissing him.
The Tribunal nonetheless made a redundancy payment equivalent to the basic award and a further two weeks’ pay “for the period consultation would have taken” — but then went on to reject his unfair dismissal claim and awarded no compensatory award for unfair dismissal overall.
What ended up in the EAT?
On appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Lady Poole), the EAT held that the Tribunal had erred in law in dismissing Mr Gormley’s unfair dismissal claim. Key reasoning included:
The Tribunal had already found Mr Gormley was dismissed for redundancy and that the employer had failed to consult. That failure was not merely procedural but goes directly to the fairness of dismissal under section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and relevant case law such as Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd (i.e., failure to consult can make a dismissal unfair).
Because the Tribunal accepted there was no consultation and that a reasonable consultation period would have been about two weeks, it was wrong in law to conclude the dismissal was fair and award no compensatory award in respect of unfair dismissal.
On that basis, the EAT substituted a finding that the unfair dismissal claim succeeded. It did not set out a specific new award figure, but clarified that the claim should have been upheld.
HR takeaways from Gormley
Consultation really matters: If an employer fails to consult before redundancy, that error goes to the core fairness of the dismissal. It isn’t something you can patch up by making a basic award or a nominal “consultation period” payment without recognising the unfairness of the dismissal overall.
Polkey principles apply on consultation: Even where redundancy is genuine, failure to consult can make a dismissal unfair because it deprives the employee of a chance to influence the outcome or find alternatives — and tribunals must treat that as a substantive fairness issue, not just a procedural defect.
Make sure consultation really happens: Employers should be clear that all statutory and good practice consultation obligations are met before dismissing for redundancy. Rushed processes or informal chats that don’t meaningfully give an employee a voice can still lead to unfair dismissal findings on appeal.
For HR teams and advisers, Gormley is a reminder that consultation is not optional or just “nice to have” — failing to consult properly can convert an otherwise straightforward redundancy into an unfair dismissal, even if redundancy itself was genuine.
When state immunity gets in the way of an overseas payroll claim
This unusual appeal turned on whether an employee of a foreign state could pursue her UK employment claims — including pay complaints — in our tribunals, or whether state immunity blocked the way. You can read the judgment here: Mrs A Muda v Malaysia [2025] EAT 193.
Background
Mrs A Muda, a Malaysian national, worked for the High Commission of Malaysia in London for many years, undertaking administrative and “social secretary” duties for the High Commissioner. She brought employment tribunal claims alleging unlawful deductions from wages and pay‑related complaints because she believed she had been doing higher‑graded duties without appropriate pay.
Malaysia sought to strike out her claim on the basis of state immunity under the State Immunity Act 1978 (SIA). At first instance, an Employment Tribunal agreed that Malaysia was immune from her contract claim because Mrs Muda was a Malaysian national and, on the tribunal’s view of the law, that meant state immunity applied as a statutory bar. The tribunal also rejected other immunity arguments based on whether the employment or conduct complained of involved sovereign authority.
What the EAT decided
Mrs Justice Heather Williams upheld the tribunal’s findings on the two points the respondent State appealed:
Employment was not a sovereign act: The EAT agreed that Mrs Muda’s duties — organising social functions, arranging invitations, preparing venues and similar administrative work — were not “sufficiently close” to governmental or diplomatic functions such that they counted as sovereign authority under the State Immunity Act. That meant these aspects of her job were treated as ordinary, private‑law employment.
Conduct complained of was not sovereign conduct: Likewise, the EAT agreed that the alleged failure to pay appropriate wages was a private contractual matter, not a sovereign act.
However, the primary legal barrier to Mrs Muda’s claim remained section 4(2)(a) of the State Immunity Act 1978, which provides that a state is immune from proceedings relating to employment contracts where the claimant is a national of the state. This provision had previously been held to be incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights by the English Court of Appeal in Spain v Lorenzo, but no remedial action had yet been taken by the government to change the statute. As a result, the EAT accepted that the tribunal was correct to apply state immunity on that basis.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and Mrs Muda’s employment claim remained barred by state immunity because she was both a national and a permanent UK resident.
HR and legal takeaways from Muda v Malaysia
State immunity matters even in employment claims: When an employer is a foreign state, statutory immunity can legally block employment contract and pay claims — even where the work took place in the UK — unless the immunity rules have been amended or successfully challenged.
Nature of duties influences jurisdictional issues: Tribunals and appeal courts will look carefully at the actual duties performed to decide whether the contract or conduct was sovereign in nature or simply commercial/administrative. In this case, routine administrative and social‑event duties did not make the employment a sovereign act.
Nationality can be decisive under the State Immunity Act: The statutory bar applies where the claimant is a national of the respondent state — even if they live and work in the UK long‑term — unless and until the statutory provision is changed
For HR teams advising on claims involving diplomatic missions or foreign states, Muda is a reminder that jurisdictional/sovereign immunity issues can be fatal to claims before merits are ever reached — and that identifying the employer’s legal personality at the outset is vital to managing risk and expectation.
When COVID adjustments, disability rights and fair dismissal collide
This appeal focuses on how reasonable adjustments and discrimination intersected with trying to keep someone at work during the pandemic — and whether the Employment Tribunal got it right. You can read the appeal judgment here: Mr Neil Duke v B and M Retail Ltd [2025] EAT 195.
Background
Mr Duke worked for B and M Retail Ltd and has a disability (a lung condition) that made him clinically extremely vulnerable to COVID‑19, confirmed by Public Health England letters. During the pandemic, his employer required him to attend work — he requested to be furloughed as a reasonable adjustment because of his disability, but this was refused. Instead, he was offered the option to stay off work on statutory sick pay while shielding.
Mr Duke brought multiple claims in the Employment Tribunal, including:
Indirect disability discrimination (arguing the employer’s approach disadvantaged him because of his disability),
Failure to make reasonable adjustments,
Unfair dismissal, and
Victimisation.
The Tribunal dismissed all his claims, and also did not deal at all with his wrongful dismissal claim.
What ended up in the EAT?
On appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Judge Tariq Sadiq) found that the Employment Tribunal had erred in law in several key ways:
Indirect discrimination: The Tribunal was wrong to find that Mr Duke was not at a particular disadvantage under the respondent’s policies and approach — the EAT said the analysis was flawed.
Objective justification: The Tribunal’s approach to whether the employer could justify its treatment of him (as a proportionate means to a legitimate aim) was defective — the EAT said this needed proper analysis.
Reasonable adjustments: The Tribunal erred both in how it considered the adjustments requested and in applying the reasonable adjustments test.
Unfair dismissal: The Tribunal’s handling of the unfair dismissal complaint was legally wrong — again, the EAT said this needed to be revisited.
Wrongful dismissal: The Tribunal failed to deal with this claim at all — a clear procedural error given it had been pleaded.
For those reasons, the EAT allowed the appeal and remitted the case to a differently constituted Employment Tribunal for a fresh hearing on all of these complaints.
HR takeaways from Duke v B & M Retail
Reasonable adjustments in pandemic/health risk contexts really matter: Employers must carefully assess adjustment requests during extraordinary circumstances (like COVID) — blanket refusals or offering only statutory sick leave may not satisfy the duty to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act 2010.
Indirect discrimination requires careful analysis: It’s not enough to treat everyone “the same” — you must consider whether a provision, criterion or practice (like attendance policies during a pandemic) disadvantages disabled people in particular.
Tribunals must address every pleaded claim: If a claimant brings a wrongful dismissal argument alongside discrimination and unfair dismissal, the tribunal must deal with it explicitly — failing to do so can be a ground for appeal.
Objective justification is technical: When employers rely on broad policies for health and safety, they must be ready to show they were genuinely necessary and proportionate — especially where disabled employees are concerned.
For HR teams, Duke underscores that health‑related adjustments and discrimination law intersect in complex ways — and that tribunals (and ultimately the EAT) will look closely at whether employers genuinely tried to accommodate disability‑linked needs in extraordinary contexts like a pandemic.
When armed forces discrimination claims hit a legal roadblock
This appeal concerned whether former members of the armed forces could bring disability discrimination claims under the Equality Act 2010 against the Ministry of Defence (MoD) — or whether statutory exceptions and immunity mean the claims are barred. You can read the full appeal judgment here: L and Paul Dunn v Ministry of Defence [2025] EAT 197.
What the cases were about
There were two linked appeals:
Mr L’s claim — he alleged he was discharged from the Army because of his disability (HIV), and argued that the statutory exemption for armed forces discrimination should be read compatibly with human rights law so his claim could proceed; and
Mr Paul Dunn’s claim — he argued that his request for his mode of exit from service to be changed to medical discharge should have been treated as a reasonable adjustment, and that the statutory 12‑month rule that blocked his claim also engaged disability discrimination law.
Legal background — Armed Forces and the Equality Act
Under the Equality Act 2010, disability and age discrimination protections normally apply to employment (Part 5). However, paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 9 says that so far as relating to age or disability, Part 5 “does not apply to service in the armed forces.” That means serving personnel generally cannot bring disability discrimination claims under the Act in the usual way.
Both appellants argued that this statutory bar should yield to their Convention rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particularly Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) read with Articles 6 (fair hearing) and/or 8 (private life). Their counsel said the Equality Act should be read in a way that avoided barring their claims if required by ECHR compatibility obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998.
What the EAT decided
Judge Linden dismissed both appeals — upholding the original Employment Tribunals’ decisions striking out the claims on statutory grounds. The key findings were:
The statutory exemption for armed forces service from disability discrimination protection is clear and unqualified in its terms (being a deliberate derogation permitted under European equality law). Parliament chose not to apply Part 5 discrimination protections to service, and the EAT could not read words into the Act to remove or limit that exemption merely to accommodate ECHR arguments.
In Mr L’s case, the tribunal below had rightly decided his claims were barred because the law expressly disapplies disability discrimination protections for “service in the armed forces”. Efforts to construe the Act compatibly with ECHR rights — for example by reading in exclusions or carve‑outs — were not permissible.
In Mr Dunn’s case, the tribunal’s conclusion that section 108 of the Act (the “relationships that have ended” provisions) could not be read down to let his claim proceed was correct in law. The statutory bar to claims was not removed by his arguments under the Human Rights Act.
Put simply, the EAT held that the statutory framework as enacted meant that members and former members of the armed forces could not pursue these disability discrimination complaints in an employment tribunal, even where human rights issues were raised.
HR and legal takeaways from L and Paul Dunn v Ministry of Defence
Armed forces exemptions are strong: The Equality Act’s express exemptions for disability discrimination in the armed forces really bite. They mean that even serious grievances about disability‑related treatment — including discharge or adjustment requests — are often not justiciable in an employment tribunal under the usual statutory framework.
Human rights arguments don’t always save a claim: Even where there are powerful policy or human rights arguments, tribunals and appeals courts will resist reading words into primary legislation that would undo a clear statutory exemption unless and until Parliament changes the law.
Practical implications for advisers: HR and legal teams dealing with defence personnel (or advising ex‑service people) should be aware that employment discrimination protections do not apply in the same way for armed forces roles — and that alternative avenues (e.g., service complaints or internal redress systems) are typically necessary.
For those advising claimants, Dunn is a reminder that jurisdictional and statutory exclusions matter hugely at the outset — and that the EAT will stick to the statutory scheme unless clear legislative change occurs.
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